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Expression Yourself:  An Analysis of the Interaction 
Between the Durbin Amendment and New York 
Surcharge Ban of the New York General Business Law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the Southern District of New York, “Alice in 
Wonderland has nothing on Section 518.”1  The law is less grounded in 
reality than Lewis Carrol’s fantasy novel about the dreams of a young 
Victorian adolescent since it only limits how merchants communicate the 
price disparity between credit cards and cash users.2  Section 518 of the 
New York General Business Law (“New York Surcharge Ban”), 
prohibits New York merchants from imposing surcharges on credit cards 
transactions even though the transactions cost the merchant more than 
cash purchases.3   
However, the New York Surcharge Ban does not apply to 
merchants that charge a higher initial price and then provide a discount 
to cash users.4  This discount exception means that the statute does not 
regulate prices, but rather how the prices are communicated.5  New York 
merchants are given a Sophie’s choice to either inexplicitly charge higher 
prices, coupled with an equally unexplainable cash discount, or risk 
violating state law by allocating higher credit cards costs directly to credit 
 
 1. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
 2. See id. (comparing Alice in Wonderland with the New York statute). 
 3. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 1984) (“No seller in any sales transaction [in 
New York] may impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of 
payment by cash, check, or similar means.”); Justin Pritchard, Why the Choice Between Debit 
or Credit Matters, THE BALANCE (updated Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/debit-
or-credit-315293. 
 4. Noah Feldman, Cash Discounts, Credit Surcharges and Free Speech, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 10, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-01-10/cash-
discounts-credit-surcharges-and-free-speech. 
 5. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1148 (2017). 
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card users.6  As a result, the New York Surcharge Ban regulates merchant 
speech.7  
The Durbin Amendment—a component of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)—limits the 
amount of interchange fees that banks can charge for debit card 
transactions.8  Banks charge merchants interchange fees for the ability to 
accept credit and debit cards in their stores.9  Since the Durbin 
Amendment caps only debit card interchange fees, credit card companies 
are incentivized to encourage credit card use among their customers.10  
Yet, merchants pay higher interchange fees on credit cards than debit 
cards.11  Although merchants are incentivized to pass both card 
processing fees to consumers, they are especially incentivized to transfer 
the credit card interchange fees.12  Unfortunately, the New York 
Surcharge Ban infringes on the merchant’s ability to take this business 
 
 6. See Feldman, supra note 4 (“[M]erchants are barred from charging credit-card 
purchasers a surcharge, but are allowed to offer discounts for paying in cash.”).  Sophie’s 
choice refers “to a difficult situation in which a person must choose between two equally 
deserving alternatives.”  Sophie’s choice, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://
en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sophie%27s_choice (last visited Jan. 29, 2018). 
 7. Feldman, supra note 4. 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 235.5(a) (2012).  The Durbin 
Amendment regulates the amount that banks with $10 billion or more in assets can charge for 
debit card interchange fees.  15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6).  The Amendment is part of Dodd–
Frank, which was passed following the Financial Crisis of 2008.  Id.; Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1021, 12 U.S.C § 5511.  Dodd-Frank requires 
banks to increase their reserves as well as hold a larger percentage of their portfolio in “easily 
liquidated” assets.  John Mazfield, The Dodd-Frank Act Explained, USA TODAY (updated 
Feb. 3, 2017, 6:46 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/02/03/the-doddfrank-
act-explained/97454748/. 
 9. Understanding Interchange, MASTERCARD, https://www.mastercard.us/en-us/about-
mastercard/what-we-do/interchange.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2018). 
 10. Scott D. Strockoz, Dodd-Frank and the Durbin Amendment—Is it Working as 
Intended?, CAPSTONE STRATEGIC PROJECT FOR THE AM. BANKERS ASS’N STONIER GRADUATE 
SCH. OF BANKING 13–14 (2012), http://www.abastonier.com/stonier/wp-content/uploads/
2012-Capstone-Strokoz.pdf; see also Todd Zywicki et al., Price Controls on Payment Card 
Interchange Fees: The U.S. Experience 19 (Geo. Mason U. Law & Econ. Research Papers 
Series, Working Paper No. 14–18, June 2014), https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/
publications/working_papers/1418.pdf (explaining how banks intensely pushed for debit card 
holders to begin using credit cards) (internal quotations omitted). 
 11. Pritchard, supra note 3. 
 12. See Pritchard, supra note 3 (“Retailers . . . . prefer that you choose debit so that they 
don’t have to pay a hefty interchange fee.”). 
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savvy action.13  However, the constitutionality of New York’s Surcharge 
Ban is in question.14   
On March 29, 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled 
that although the New York Surcharge Ban “regulates speech,” the issue 
of whether it “survive[s] First Amendment scrutiny” will have to be 
decided by the Second Circuit.15  A ruling against New York’s Surcharge 
Ban would protect the First Amendment rights of merchants, as well as 
their ability to conduct efficient business.16  
This Note analyzes the tension caused by the coexistence of the 
Durbin Amendment and the New York Surcharge Ban.  It proceeds in 
five parts.  Part II provides background knowledge regarding interchange 
fees, the New York Surcharge Ban, and the Durbin Amendment.17  Part 
III analyzes Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, the recently 
remanded Supreme Court case, and the relevant First Amendment 
implications of the New York Surcharge Ban.18  Part IV outlines the 
negative effects that the Durbin Amendment and the New York 
Surcharge Ban have on New York merchants.19  Part V summarizes the 
previous arguments and suggests a further course of action.20 
II. THE BASICS OF A CREDIT/DEBIT CARD TRANSACTION 
A. Credit Card Transactions 
In many credit card transactions, there are four parties to 
consider: the consumer, the merchant, the acquiring bank, and the issuing 
 
 13. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1155 (2017) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[Plaintiffs] do not use their preferred pricing systems or displays 
for fear of violating § 518.”). 
 14. Id. at 1147 (majority opinion). 
 15. Id. at 1151.  The Supreme Court ruled only on whether the state law regulates free 
speech.  Id at 1145.  The Court then remanded the case to the Second Circuit to decide if the 
regulation of speech “survive[s] First Amendment scrutiny.”  Id. 
 16. See Feldman, supra note 4 (“The issue in the case . . . . [is] how merchants are 
allowed to describe the prices that exist as a matter of economic reality. That should subject 
the rule to at least the level of free-speech analysis that applies to commercial transaction 
. . . .”). 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
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bank.21  Credit card companies, through issuing banks, provide credit and 
debit cards to consumers.22  Acquiring banks contract with merchants that 
choose to accept credit card transactions.23  
In a typical card transaction there is a four-part sequence among 
these parties.24  First, a consumer uses a credit or debit card to make a 
purchase from a merchant.25  Second, the merchant contacts an acquiring 
bank, which transfers the requested funds to the merchant.26  The 
acquiring bank deducts a small percentage of the merchant payment, 
called a “discount fee,” for processing the debit or credit card payments.27  
Third, the issuing bank will reimburse the acquiring bank less an 
“interchange fee.”28  The acquiring bank will pass along this fee to 
merchants by charging a discount fee that is at least equal to the 
interchange fee.29  Finally, the issuing bank withdraws funds, equal to the 
total purchase price, from the cardholder’s account.30 
Interchange fees compensate issuing banks for the lost interest 
incurred during the “cardholder’s grace period for repaying their debt.”31  
The cost of interchange fees is “based on authorization costs, losses due 
to fraud and credit and the average bank cost of the funds.”32  Intuitively, 
the fees should be as low as possible, since there are a number of 
competing credit card companies.33  However, because the issuing banks 
 
 21. Richard Gendal Brown, A Simple Explanation of Fees in the Payment Card Industry, 
RICHARD GENDAL BROWN (Aug. 9, 2014, 6:47 PM), https://gendal.me/2014/08/09/a-simple-
explanation-of-fees-in-the-payment-card-industry/. 
 22. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Brown, supra note 21. 
 26. Brown, supra note 21. 
 27. Brown, supra note 21. 
 28. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Ben Dwyer, Interchange Rates and Fees, CARDFELLOW, https://
www.cardfellow.com/interchange-fee/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2018). 
 32. Interchange Rate, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/interchange-
rate.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2018). 
 33. See European Commission Press Release MEMO/16/2162, Antitrust: Regulation of 
Interchange Fees (June 9, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-
2162_en.htm (“Usually, competition leads to lower prices since companies compete by 
offering lower prices than their competitors.  In the case of interchange fees, the opposite 
occurs.”). 
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benefit from the interchange fees, credit card companies must compete 
for the issuing banks’ business by offering “higher interchange fees.”34  
Consequently, merchants are charged a higher discount fee since the 
discount fee is heavily contingent on the price of interchange fees.35  
B. Debit Card Transactions 
Debit card purchases are comprised of on-line or off-line 
transactions.36  During an on-line transaction, a debit card user enters their 
“personal identification number” (“PIN”) into a store-owned PIN pad.37  
The issuing bank then immediately confirms that the cardholder has 
sufficient funds before transferring it to the acquiring bank.38  Therefore, 
issuing banks have less risk of receiving a default payment from the 
consumer.39  
During an off-line purchase, debit card holders do not enter a PIN, 
but instead sign a slip to authorize the transaction.40  Issuing banks do not 
always verify that the debit card user has sufficient funds.41  As a result, 
issuing banks have similar levels of consumer default risk for both credit 
card purchases and off-line debit card purchases.42  However, even with 
the disparity in risk between on-line and off-line purchases, both payment 
systems have similar average interchange fees.43  Specifically, on-line 
purchases charge $0.23 per transaction, while off-line purchases charge 
$0.24 per transaction.44 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d at 130. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 130–31. 
 39. Id. at 131. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. (“[T]he card-issuing institutions does not necessarily verify that there are 
sufficient funds . . . .”). 
 43. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., REGULATION II (DEBIT CARD 
INTERCHANGE FEES AND ROUTING), https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/regii-
average-interchange-fee.htm (last updated July 14, 2017). 
 44. Id. 
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C. Durbin Amendment 
Free-market enthusiasts heavily criticized the passage of the 
Durbin Amendment for disrupting the interactions between customers, 
merchants, and prepayment cards.45  But politicians justified the 
legislation with the promise that acquiring banks would pass along their 
savings—from lower interchange fees—to merchants who would then 
charge consumers less for goods.46  In addition, the Durbin Amendment 
allowed small banks, with less than $10 billion in assets, to continue 
charging their usual debit card rates.47  Unfortunately, any benefits these 
small banks received was undermined by the compliance costs associated 
with other portions of Dodd-Frank.48 
Under the Durbin Amendment, issuing banks can only charge 
amounts that are “reasonable and proportional” to their incurred costs in 
debit card transactions.49  These restrictions limit interchange fees to the 
combination of $0.21 plus five basis points for each transaction.50  
Although lower debit card interchange fees typically benefit consumers,51 
the Durbin Amendment also forbids the reimbursement of many expenses 
related to debit card interchange fees including “customer service, data 
services, branch networks, card issuance, [as well as] fraud and loss 
protection.”52  These changes, which went into effect on October 11, 
 
 45. See Rob Nichols, The Durbin Amendment: A Costly Price Control Experiment, THE 
HILL (June 27, 2016, 9:46 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/
284842-the-durbin-amendment-a-costly-price-control-experiment (“Price controls have 
faded away for a reason, and the Durbin Amendment is one more example of an idea whose 
time has gone.”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. 12 C.F.R. § 235.5(a)(1)(ii). 
 48. See Nichols, supra note 45 (“[C]ommunity banks, even those that were supposedly 
‘exempted’ from the Durbin Amendment, have faced increased compliance costs related to 
the law’s other provisions.”). 
 49. 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(a). 
 50. Id.  In 2015, the average interchange fee fell to $0.23.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RES. SYS., 2015 INTERCHANGE FEE REVENUE, COVERED ISSUER COSTS, AND COVERED 
ISSUER AND MERCHANT FRAUD LOSSES RELATED TO DEBIT CARD TRANSACTIONS 3, https://
www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/debitfees_costs_2015.pdf. 
 51. Margarette Burnette, The Durbin Amendment Explained, NERDWALLET, https://
www.nerdwallet.com/blog/banking/durbin-amendment-explained/ (last updated Aug. 30, 
2017). 
 52. Zywicki et al., supra note 10, at 5. 
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2011,53 are estimated to cost banks between $6.6 and $8 billion in annual 
revenue.54 
 In order to recoup the lost revenue, banks encourage credit card 
use—as opposed to debit card use—among their customers since credit 
card usage results in a higher fee on each transaction.55  For example, 
MasterCard’s “Standard” fee on “Core Value” credit card transactions is 
2.95% of the amount purchased, in addition to a $0.10 fixed fee, while 
debit card transaction fees are limited to $0.21 plus five basis points of 
each transaction’s value.56  Specific techniques used by banks to increase 
credit card use include reducing debit card reward programs and offering 
free checking accounts.57  Banks also attracted more credit card users by 
increasing their direct-mail sales efforts.58  These efforts were successful, 
and debit card growth has declined since the Durbin Amendment’s 
passage.59  In 2009, debit cards accounted for 35% of retail payments.60  
However, by 2011, debit card usage plummeted to 23.7%, while credit 
card purchases increased by 27.8%.61 
Some of the measures taken by banks to increase credit card 
usage have come at the expense of low-income individuals.62  Merchants 
raise their prices in order to pass along the credit card surcharge to their 
customers.63  This produces an inequitable result since both cash payers 
and credit users pay for the price increases, but many low-income earners 
are not responsible for the credit card surcharge.64  This is because many 
 
 53. Zywicki et al., supra note 10, at 5. 
 54. Zywicki et al., supra note 10, at 5. 
 55. Zywicki et al., supra note 10, at 18 (citing Todd Zywicki, The Dick Durbin Bank 
Fees, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2011, 7:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052970204831304576597173130633798. 
 56. 12 CFR § 235.3; Mastercard 2017–2018 U.S Region Interchange Programs and 
Rates, MASTERCARD (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.mastercard.us/content/dam/mccom/en 
. . ./merchant-interchange-rates.pdf. 
 57. Burnette, supra note 51. 
 58. Zywicki, The Dick Durbin Bank Fees, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2011, 7:07 PM), https:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204831304576597173130633798. 
 59. Zywicki et al., supra note 10, at 18. 
 60. Fumiko Hayashi, The New Debit Card Regulations: Initial Effects on Networks and 
Banks, FED. RES. BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REV. 82 (2012), http://www.kansascityfed.org/
publicat/econrev/pdf/12q4Hayashi.pdf. 
 61. Strockoz, supra note 10, at 14. 
 62. See Brief for Petitioner at 6, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 
2d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13-4533) (“This state of affairs results in high-cost, high-reward 
credit card users being subsidized by low-cost credit card users . . . .”). 
 63. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 5. 
 64. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 6. 
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low-income individuals do not own a credit card.65  Hence, these 
surcharges have caused poor people to help pay for the credit card usage 
of “wealthy Platinum card holder[s].”66 
D. State Surcharge Bans 
In 1974, Congress amended the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) 
to forbid credit and debit card issuers from stopping merchants from 
issuing discounts to cash paying customers.67  TILA was amended again, 
in 1976, to bar businesses from implementing surcharges on credit card 
using customers.68  The surcharge ban did not last long.69  Although the 
TILA surcharge ban expired in 1984, the prohibition on “contractually 
barr[ed] discounts” for cash paying customers stayed in force.70  Eleven 
states passed surcharge bans in response to the lack of federal 
legislation.71  Ultimately, Expressions will decide whether state surcharge 
bans can continue to infringe on the First Amendment.72 
III.   MERCHANTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO NEW YORK’S 
SURCHARGE BAN 
Similar to surcharge bans passed in other states, the New York 
Surcharge Ban prohibits merchants from charging credit card users a 
higher amount than cash users.73  However, this ban does not apply to 
 
 65. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 6. 
 66. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 5. 
 67. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1147 (2017) (citing 
amendments adopted in 1974 to the TILA, which can be found in Pub.L. 93-495, § 306, 88 
Stat. 1515). 
 68. Id. (citing amendments to the TILA adopted on February 27, 1976, which can be 
found in Pub.L. 94-222, § 3(c)(1), 90 Stat. 197). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
York, Oklahoma and Puerto Rico have imposed bans on credit card surcharges.  Heather 
Morton, Credit Card or Debit Card Surcharge Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/credit-or-
debit-card-surcharges-statutes.aspx.  California’s surcharge law—similar to New York’s—
forbid merchants from implementing a surcharge on payments made with a credit card.  Id.  
A federal district court later found California’s surcharge law to be in violation of the First 
Amendment.  Id. 
 72. Expressions, 137 S. Ct. at 1144. 
 73. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 1984) (“No seller in any sales transaction [in 
New York] may impose a surcharge on a holder who elects to use a credit card in lieu of 
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merchants that charge a higher initial price and then provide a discount 
to cash purchasers.74  As explained by the Second Circuit, “if a seller’s 
regular price is $100, it may not charge credit-card customers $103 and 
cash customers $100, but if the seller’s regular price is $103, it may 
charge credit card customers $103 and cash customers $100.”75  The 
merchants did not use this method because they wanted their consumers 
to know “that they are not the bad guys,” and that customer hostility 
should instead be directed at credit card companies.76  This exception 
causes the statute to regulate speech since merchants are unable to 
publicize to customers that the reason for the increased prices is because 
of credit card surcharges.77  
Numerous merchants challenged the legality of the New York 
Surcharge Ban on credit card transactions in the case of Expressions Hair 
Design v. Schneiderman.78  In Expressions, the plaintiffs—five New 
York merchants—attempted to pass along surcharges to their customers 
who chose to use credit cards instead of cash.79  The merchants alleged 
that a significant portion of their revenue is spent on credit card discount 
fees to acquiring banks.80  
The Supreme Court ruled that the New York Surcharge Ban does 
regulate merchant speech and subsequently remanded Expressions to the 
Second Circuit to decide if the statute’s regulation of speech is 
unconstitutional.81  Ultimately, the Second Circuit will decide if the 
statute is constitutional under the commercial speech standard established 
in Central Hudson Gas.82  
 
payment by cash, check, or similar means.”); see also Pritchard, supra note 3 (Merchants 
prefer to “add credit card surcharges (which aren’t allowed with debit card purchases under 
federal law) . . . to customers that pay with plastic.”). 
 74. Feldman, supra note 4. 
 75. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated 
and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017). 
 76. Expressions, 137 S. Ct. at 1148. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1155. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  The Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) defines surcharges as “any means of 
increasing the regular price to a cardholder which is not imposed upon customers paying by 
cash, check, or similar means.”  15 U.S.C. § 1602(r) (2016). 
 81. Expressions, 137 S. Ct. at 1151. 
 82. Id.  Essentially when it comes to commercial speech, the Supreme Court uses 
intermediate scrutiny.  Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
1090 (3d ed. 2006) (citing Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995)). 
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Under the Central Hudson Gas standard, the State of New York 
will have to satisfy a four-part test in order for its statute to be found 
constitutional.83  First, the commercial speech “must concern lawful 
activity and not be misleading.”84  Second, the government’s interest in 
advancing the statute must be substantial.85  Third, the legislation must 
“directly advance the government’s interest.”86  Fourth, the legislation 
must not be “more extensive than necessary to achieve the government’s 
interest.”87  
During the case, New York attempted to satisfy the test by 
providing two justifications.88  Specifically, the State claims that the law 
will prevent “bait and switch tactics” as well as limit the ability of 
merchants to charge unnecessarily high fees.89  However, neither of the 
two justifications meet the necessary threshold outlined in Central 
Hudson Gas.90 
Eric Schneiderman, the New York Attorney General, alleges that 
there are two justifications for enforcing the New York Surcharge Ban.91  
Schneiderman first claims that the New York Surcharge Ban prevents the 
use of “bait and switch tactics.”92  These tactics refer to merchants who 
advertise one price on the shelf and then charge a different price at the 
register.93  Schneiderman then claims that the legislation stops merchants 
from “us[ing] surcharges to ‘levy excessive fees on customers.’”94  These 
justifications are either overbroad or too invasive.95  Therefore, the New 
York Surcharge Ban should fail under the fourth Central Gas prong since 
 
 83. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 82, at 1090 (citing Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service 
Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
 84. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 82, at 1090 (citing Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566). 
 85. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 82, at 1090. 
 86. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 82, at 1090. 
 87. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 82, at 1090. 
 88. Brief for Petitioner at 10–11, Expressions Hair Decision v. Schneiderman, No. 13-
4533 (2d Cir. June 20, 2017). 
 89. Id. (citing Appellant Schneiderman Suppl. Letter Br. at 25–26, filed July 13, 2017, 
Dkt. No. 259). 
 90. Id. at 11. 
 91. Id. at 10–11. 
 92. Id. at 11 (citing Appellant Schneiderman Suppl. Letter Br. at 25–26, filed July 13, 
2017, Dkt. No. 259). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (citing Appellant Schneiderman Suppl. Letter Br. at 26–30, filed July 13, 2017, 
Dkt. No. 259). 
 95. Id. at 11–12 (explaining that New York’s justifications for the surcharge ban either 
“hugely overbroad” or can be accomplished through “less restrictive means.”). 
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the state legislation is “more extensive than necessary to serve the State’s 
interest.”96 
Although the New York Surcharge Ban may undermine “bait and 
switch tactics,” it is “hugely overbroad.”97  Instead, the state legislature 
should implement disclosure rules, which forbid merchants from 
publicizing one price and then charging a different price.98  This method 
protects consumers from excessive surcharging without being 
unnecessarily broad.99  These rules suggest that surcharges and discounts 
should be disclosed and made available to customers.100  
New York’s second justification can also be met with a less 
intrusive method.101  Although the surcharge ban is one method to 
dissuade “excessive fees,” the State’s objectives can be achieved through 
more specific means.102  For example, Minnesota law forbids surcharges 
from “exceed[ing] [5%] of the purchase price.”103  New York could also 
enforce its current false-advertising laws.104  The New York Surcharge 
Ban operates as an “anti-disclosure law” by inhibiting communication 
between merchants and consumers as to the impact that credit cards have 
on store prices.105  In addition, the State’s concern for “excessive fees” is 
misguided since there is little evidence to support its existence.106  In fact, 
the State’s cited study “concedes” that there is limited empirical evidence 
to suggest that merchants are charging excessive fees.107  The study even 
 
 96. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 82, at 1090 (citing Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service 
Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
 97. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 11. 
 98. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 11–12. 
 99. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 11–12 (citing Cash Discount Act, 1981: Hearing 
on S. 414 Before the Senate Banking Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (Feb. 18, 1981)). 
 100. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 12 (“Disclosure requirements like those 
proposed by the Federal Reserve Board would entirely protect consumers from abusive 
surcharging.”). 
 101. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 12. 
 102. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 13. 
 103. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 13 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.051(1)(a) 
(West 2004)). 
 104. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 13. 
 105. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62 (explaining that New York’s no-surcharge law acts 
as an anti-disclosure law by forcing merchants to “keep consumers in the dark about the true 
cost of credit card usage”). 
 106. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 12. 
 107. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62 (citing Marc Rysman & Julian Wright, The 
Economics of Payment Cards, at 16 (Nov. 29, 2012) (Working Paper, Boston University & 
National University of Singapore)). 
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recognizes that additional research on “surcharg[e] behavior” would be 
helpful.108  
IV. DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS 
The Durbin Amendment and the New York Surcharge Ban have 
led to many negative consequences for merchants and consumers.109  One 
example is that small merchants do not receive the same favorable terms 
as large retailers since small merchants are not responsible for a sufficient 
number of transactions.110  In addition, the Durbin Amendment saves 
small merchants less than as was originally expected because credit card 
companies have started to charge small merchants more for credit card 
transactions in order to recoup the lost revenue from capped debit card 
interchange fees.111  Therefore, New York merchants must pay the 
heightened transaction fees with less than expected savings.112  Also, low-
income consumers will be forced to pay a portion of credit costs even 
though they often do not utilize a credit card.113  This is because New 
York merchants are unable to directly charge credit card users through 
surcharges.114 
 
 108. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62 (citing Marc Rysman & Julian Wright, The 
Economics of Payment Cards, at 16 (Nov. 29, 2012) (Working Paper, Boston Univserity & 
National University of Singapore)). 
 109. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 9–10. 
 110. Samuel Merchant, Merchant Restraints: Credit-Card-Transaction Surcharging and 
Interchange-Fee Regulation in the Wake of Landmark Industry Changes, 68 OKL. L. REV. 
327, 339 (2016). 
 111. IAN LEE ET AL., CREDIT WHERE IT’S DUE: HOW PAYMENT CARDS BENEFIT CANADIAN 
MERCHANTS AND CONSUMERS, AND HOW REGULATION CAN HARM THEM 28 (Oct. 2013). 
 112. See also id. at 33 (“[M]any small merchants have actually seen their interchange fees 
rise as a result of the Durbin Amendment . . . .”). 
 113. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 6 (“[O]nly about 40[%] of the lowest-
income quintile of Americans owns a credit card versus 97[%] of households earning over 
$120,000 per year.”). 
 114. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 7 (“If New York’s no-surcharge law is deemed 
unconstitutional, consumers will eventually reap the rewards of lower merchant fees . . . .”).  
Australia passed legislation, similar to the Durbin Amendment, and struggled with the 
unintended consequences.  Howard Chang et al., The Effect of Regulatory Intervention in 
Two-Sided Markets: An Assessment of Interchange-Fee Capping in Australia, REVIEW OF 
NETWORK ECON. 2 (Sept. 26, 2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=820044.  Specifically, the country’s credit card companies regained 
their lost revenue through annual and issuing fees, which hurt consumers.  See EUROPE ECON. 
CHANCERY HOUSE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INTERCHANGE FEE REGULATION 38 (Sept. 25, 
2014) (“[B]anks responded to the reduction in their revenue from [interchange fees] by 
increasing the level of other fees.”).  In addition, a Cannex study suggested that less than 5% 
of Australian merchants passed along the savings from interchange fees onto consumers.  
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A. Small Merchants Have Less Bargaining Power than Large 
Retailers 
Credit card companies, like Visa and MasterCard, dictate the 
rules of their respective networks.115  These rules include the amount of 
interchange fees that issuing banks may charge acquiring banks.116  The 
interchange fee, charged to acquiring banks, inherently determines how 
much the acquiring bank charges the merchant through discount fees.117  
Ultimately the heightened discount fee affects consumers who have to 
pay an inflated price.118 
Regrettably, acquiring banks do not have the power to negotiate 
for lower credit card interchange fees.119  In fact, acquiring banks do not 
even negotiate with individual issuers.120  Instead, the acquiring banks 
join a network and implicitly agree to all network rules, including the rate 
of interchange fees.121  Therefore, acquiring banks are subject to charge 
a discount fee that is at least as much as the interchange fee that they are 
mandated to pay through the network.122  The insulation of acquiring 
banks from negotiating interchange fees inherently stops merchants from 
negotiating their own merchant discount fee.123 
Large retailers are able to avoid paying these additional 
transaction fees.124  The retail conglomerates have higher sales volume, 
which means that they are responsible for a greater amount of interchange 
and merchant discount fees charged by the respective banks.125  Higher 
sales gives the large retailers leverage over the credit card network, which 
can be used to force banks to charge a lower merchant discount fee.126 
 
Chang et al., supra note 114, at 19 (citing Cannex Australia (2004) data on merchant service 
fees). 
 115. Merchant, supra note 110, at 339. 
 116. Merchant, supra note 110, at 339. 
 117. In re Visa Check/Matermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 118. Pritchard, supra note 3. 
 119. Merchant, supra note 110, at 339. 
 120. Merchant, supra note 110, at 339. 
 121. Merchant, supra note 110, at 339. 
 122. Merchant, supra note 110, at 339. 
 123. Merchant, supra note 110, at 339. 
 124. Merchant, supra note 110, at 340. 
 125. Merchant, supra note 110, at 340. 
 126. Merchant, supra note 110, at 340. 
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Unlike large conglomerates, small merchants struggle to assert 
any leverage over the credit card networks.127  Therefore, small 
merchants should be allowed to pass along interchange fees to consumers 
since they are not in a position to negotiate with the larger credit card 
corporations.128  In order to rectify this disparity, New York could allow 
only small retailers to pass along the fees to their customers.129  The State 
could do this by only allowing retailers to charge the higher prices if they 
are below a certain sales threshold.130  If New York merchants are not 
given this option—through an invalidation of Section 518—then they 
will not be given an opportunity to protect their profit margin.131 
B. New York Merchants Are Not Saving as Much on the Durbin 
Amendment as Expected 
New York merchants are not saving a tremendous amount of 
money from the Durbin Amendment.132  In fact, a survey by the 
Electronic Payments Coalition revealed that the Durbin Amendment only 
saved American merchants an average of $0.07 on a $40 debit card 
transaction.133  In addition, credit card companies now charge smaller 
merchants heightened fees.134  Before the Durbin Amendment, many 
merchant discount rates were based on a variable percentage of each 
transaction value.135  Therefore, a small business, with low-priced goods, 
would pay lower merchant discount fees than businesses that sold high-
 
 127. Merchant, supra note 110, at 339–340. 
 128. See Merchant, supra note 110, at 339 (“Thus, the small business owner has no 
bargaining power to negotiate policies or fees . . . .”). 
 129. See Floyd Norris, Credit Card Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2009, 9:36 AM), https:/
/economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/credit-card-subsidies/ (“[B]rings to light many of 
the things that small retailers have been saying for years.  These hidden costs are reluctantly, 
but necessarily passed on to all consumers . . . .”). 
 130. See id. (describing the costs that are incurred by small retailers). 
 131. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 7 (“[T]he no-surcharge law will continue 
to continue to facilitate supra-competitive merchant fees, as well as the heightened retail 
prices and unjust cross-subsidization that such restrictions engender.”). 
 132. See LEE ET AL., supra note 111, at 33 (“[M]any small merchants have actually seen 
their interchange fees rise as a result of the Durbin Amendment . . . .”). 
 133. LEE ET AL., supra note 111, at 16. 
 134. See LEE ET AL., supra note 111, at 17 (“Prior to the Durbin Amendment, [smaller 
companies] . . . paid a special interchange fee that was lower than for other industries.  In 
response to the Durbin Amendment, however, payment card networks eliminated this 
subsidized rate . . . .”). 
 135. Burnette, supra note 51. 
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priced goods.136  After the Durbin Amendment, credit card companies 
were unable to receive the same level of revenue from the higher priced 
transactions since they were capped by the $0.21 maximum.137  
Consequently, credit card companies, in an effort to regain lost revenue, 
started to charge $0.21 on every transaction.138   
Some large corporations are able to pass the heightened credit 
card fees to their customers.139  For example, Redbox increased “its prices 
for a rental from $1.00 to $1.20 in response to the higher fees imposed 
. . . .”140  Although New York merchants can employ the same flat price 
increase, they are not allowed to indicate to their customers that the 
reason for the price increase is because of the surcharge restrictions.141  
Unfortunately, New York merchants, because of the New York 
Surcharge Ban, are unable to indicate the motivations of their practice.142  
Hence, New York merchants are at an immediate disadvantage when 
trying to recoup the diminished profit margin that results from the Durbin 
Amendment.143 
C. Credit Card Fees are Passed on to the Poor 
The New York Surcharge Ban forces merchants to allocate 
heightened credit card fees to low-income consumers.144  These low-
income Americans often do not own credit cards and are thus not 
responsible for the merchant discount fees paid by businesses.145  In fact, 
 
 136. Burnette, supra note 51. 
 137. See Burnette, supra note 51 (“But when the rules took effect in 2011, big banks began 
looking for ways to recoup some of the lost revenue, which was estimated at $14 billion a 
year . . . .”). 
 138. Burnette, supra note 51. 
 139. LEE ET AL., supra note 111, at 17. 
 140. LEE ET AL., supra note 111, at 17. 
 141. See Expressions Hair Decision v. Schneiderman, 137 S.Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017) (“The 
law tells merchants nothing about the amount they are allowed to collect from a cash or credit 
card payer.”). 
 142. Id. at 1148. 
 143. See LEE ET AL., surpa note 111, at 17 (“[The Durbin Amendment] has been a debacle 
for smaller merchants that have actually seen their interchange fees rise . . . .”). 
 144. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 6 (“[H]igh-cost, high-reward credit card 
users [are] being subsidized by low-cost credit card users and, to a greater extent, debit card 
and cash-based consumers.”). 
 145. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62 (describing that many low-income consumers 
do not own credit cards, which consequently means that they are not responsible for the 
additional card fees incurred by merchants). 
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approximately 97% of Americans earning over a $120,000, own a credit 
card, while “only about 40[%] of the lowest-income quintile of 
Americans own a credit card.”146  Therefore, merchants have attempted 
to avoid allocating costs to low-income consumers by charging credit 
card users directly via surcharges.147  
Merchants in thirty-nine states are able to impose surcharges onto 
credit card users, which allows them to avoid allocating costs to low-
income consumers.148  Merchants will even advertise these surcharges by 
using signs similar to the one described by the Supreme Court—”$10 (we 
add a 3% surcharge if you pay by credit card).”149  However, the New 
York Surcharge Ban forbids merchants from imposing any surcharge 
onto customers using credit cards.150  As a result, merchants must disperse 
the added costs onto all consumers, including low-income customers.151  
Added costs lead to higher prices, which disproportionately affects low-
income customers.152   
V. CONCLUSION 
The Durbin Amendment capped the amount that banks can 
charge on debit card interchange fees.153  The Amendment’s passage 
inadvertently incentivized credit card companies to encourage the use of 
credit cards, rather than debit cards, since credit cards continue to have 
unregulated interchange fees.154  Credit card companies have been 
successful in promoting credit card use even though their interchange fees 
are higher than debit card interchange fees.155 
 
 146. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62 (citing Scott Schuh et al., Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payments?, at 3 (2010), https:/
/www.bostonfed.org/economic/ppdp/2010/ppdp1003.pdf. 
 147. See Norris, supra note 129 (“The most effective and fair solution is to charge the 
additional costs of transactions using credit cards to the consumers who choose to use them.”). 
 148. Morton, supra note 71. 
 149. Expressions Hair Decision v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1149 (2017). 
 150. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2010). 
 151. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 6. 
 152. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 62, at 6 (“[I]n absolute terms, the estimated transfer 
is about $1.4 billion to $1.9 billion from poorer, non-rewards card users to wealthier, rewards 
card users on gasoline and grocery purchases alone.”). 
 153. 12 C.F.R. § 235.5(a) (2017). 
 154. Zywicki et al., supra note 10, at 17–18 (citing Todd Zywicki, The Dick Durbin Bank 
Fees, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2011, 7:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 
10001424052970204831304576597173130633798; see 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2016). 
 155. Zywicki et al., supra note 10, at 20. 
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Despite the increase in credit card usage, with high interchange 
fees, New York merchants are forbidden from publicizing that they are 
charging a higher amount on goods because of the interchange fees on 
credit cards.156  The legislation also hurts low-income consumers because 
merchants are unable to pass the interchange fees directly to credit card 
users.157  Instead, the merchants disperse the interchange fees to all 
consumers, even though many low-income customers do not use a credit 
card.158  Thus, New York merchants are impeded from allocating the 
heightened cost fairly to their customers.159  
The justifications for the state legislation are undermined when 
their practical effects are studied.160  New York’s “bait and switch” 
justification can be achieved through enforcement of current legislation, 
while little evidence exists to support that merchants are charging unfairly 
high prices.161  In light of these consequences, the Second Circuit should 
overturn New York’s Surcharge Ban so that merchants can fully exercise 
their First Amendment rights and allocate heightened costs to the correct 
customers.162  Otherwise, New York will undermine not only the First 
Amendment’s “bedrock principal,”163 but also this country’s innate belief 
that every person should have the chance to manifest their economic 
destiny.  
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